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 COMMUNICATION IN CRISIS: AN ANALYSIS OF THE ROLE ORGANIZATIONAL 
STRUCTURES PLAY IN THE EFFECTIVENESS OF CRISIS COMMUNICATION 
 
ELIZABETH SCHRAUBEN 
Grand Valley State University 
 
   Managing an organizational crisis is fraught with challenges.  Uncertainties and quick calls 
for action create circumstances in which effective decision making is difficult.  Furthermore, as 
the impact of a crisis grows, so does the recognition of the necessity of effective crisis 
communication. Examining how public organizations have responded to the challenges of crisis 
communication reveals the pivotal role played by organizational factors in the effectiveness of 
communication and information processing.  This paper, informed specifically by an E. coli 
outbreak at Michigan State University and its related communication mishaps, analyzes how an 
organization’s structure affects crisis communication.  A review of the literature, along with 
additional examples of real-world public health crises, illustrates that organizational structures, 
primarily those linked to bureaucracy and hierarchy, often create barriers that impede 
communication.  As a result, strategies to improve organizational design and function through 
structural empowerment, the creation of lateral relationships, and organizational learning are 
discussed.  This analysis concludes that recognizing the structural origins of communication 
breakdowns allows crisis managers and public administrators to (1) better identify and minimize 
the negative aspects of problematic structures and (2) utilize organizational design strategies 
and information processing techniques that will improve communication during future crises. 
Recommendations for further research and analysis are also presented in the final section. 
 
  
MSU E. COLI CASE STUDY 
 
   On September 15, 2008, Sparrow Hospital health officials notified the Office of the University 
Physician (UPhys) at Michigan State University (MSU) that six students living in on-campus 
residence halls had been admitted with classic symptoms of Escherichia coli or E. coli, a serious 
and potentially fatal bacterial infection spread primarily by contaminated food and water.  In 
response, UPhys staff immediately notified the Ingham County Health Department (ICHD) 
regarding the ill students and an investigation into the possible source of the infections 
commenced.  In the following days, more students were admitted to area hospitals or treated at 
the on-campus Olin Student Health Center with similar symptoms. With each new case, anxiety 
about the possibility of a large scale outbreak increased among University administrators 
(Wernette-Babian, personal communication, April 3, 2009).  On September 19, 2008, ICHD 
officials confirmed, through DNA analysis, the suspected diagnosis that all of the initial six 
students had been infected with the same 0157:H7 strain of E. coli.  At that time an additional 17 
student cases were suspected and awaiting confirmation (Rook, 2008, p. B1).   
   On campus an extensive investigation into the source of the contamination continued with a 
focus on the east complex residence hall cafeterias, but the source remained unknown.  MSU 
officials, in response to mounting student, parent, and media demands for action, became 
increasingly anxious that the source of the infections had yet to be determined.  The feeling that 
‘something’ had to be done was widespread.  The University Physician, in conversations with the 
ICHD director and Michigan Department of Community Health (MDCH) officials discovered 
that a turkey bologna product had recently been the source of an E. coli outbreak in a 
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southwestern Michigan jail.  The University Physician shared this information with the Vice 
President for Finance and Operations and the Assistant Vice President for Housing and Food 
Services.  As a result of this conversation, and without consultation with the MSU Food and 
Water Sanitarian or the individual residence hall housing and food service managers, the 
University Physician and Vice President for Finance and Operations decided, on September 23, 
2008, to remove all turkey from resident hall cafeterias (Wernette-Babian, personal 
communication, April 3, 2009).  Concurrently, University Relations released an official 
statement that MSU had voluntarily removed turkey from all the residence halls (Cassella & 
Oswald, 2008).   
   Following this decision, there was widespread anxiety on campus among persons who had 
recently consumed turkey and unease concerning the decision’s merits among housing and food 
service staff, as well as the Food and Water Sanitarian.  Shortly thereafter, the trade association, 
Michigan Turkey Producers, contacted the University, irate that their products were being 
associated with an E. coli outbreak without scientific confirmation.  It was also revealed, after 
top level MSU officials held a meeting with housing and food service managers and the Food 
and Water Sanitarian, that MSU did not and never had stocked the turkey product that had 
caused the E. coli outbreak in the jail.  Faced with the lack of merit behind their decision, but 
with few other viable options for mitigating the outbreak, University administrators decided to 
maintain the ban on turkey and wait for further information from MDCH.  Four days later, after 
further testing was conducted by MDCH, it was discovered that contaminated iceberg lettuce, 
supplied by Aunt Mid’s Produce Corporation, had actually been the source of the infections.  
New correct information had to be immediately released to the public and Aunt Mid’s lettuce 
was quickly removed from all residence hall cafeterias (Wernette-Babian, personal 
communication, April 3, 2009).  In the end, the investigation into the MSU related illnesses 
uncovered that they were part of a larger multi-state outbreak involving 50 individuals, a point 
that MSU officials strongly emphasized in public statements in order to weaken the connection 
between the University and the tainted food (Olszewski & Koivisto, 2008).  
 
THE CASE STUDY: KEY QUESTIONS 
 
   The MSU E. coli outbreak serves as a valuable case study demonstrating a critical breakdown 
in crisis communication within a complex organization.  In this context, crisis communication 
refers to “the sending and receiving of messages ‘to prevent or lessen the negative outcomes of a 
crisis and thereby protect the organization, stakeholders, and/or industry from damage’ ” (as 
cited in Seeger & Reynolds, 2008, p. 10).  As a result, the case study raises important questions 
regarding the relationship between organizational factors and the effectiveness of crisis 
communication.  The most compelling of these questions include:  Is the situation presented in 
the MSU case study unique or does it exemplify common instances of communication 
breakdowns that occur in organizations?  Is a breakdown in crisis communication simply an 
example of poor crisis management or is it a symptom of a deficiency in organizational design?  
Are there specific organizational structures or characteristics that significantly contribute to a 
lack of effective information gathering, processing, and sharing?  Lastly, are there 
techniques/strategies available that can be utilized to improve organizational design and function 
in order to enhance communication in general and also during crises?  To begin answering these 
questions, it is essential to look at the role organizational structures, particularly those related to 
bureaucracy and hierarchy, play in determining the effectiveness of communication and 
information processing. 
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Theoretical Overview of Bureaucratic and Hierarchical Structures 
   The details of the MSU case study reveal a breakdown in communication that appears to have 
more to do with organizational structuring and less to do with communication alone.  In this 
analysis, organizational structuring “focuses on the division of labor of an organizational mission 
into a number of distinct tasks, and then the coordination of all these tasks to accomplish that 
mission in a unified way” (Mitzberg, 1980, p. 324).  The manner in which organizations 
structure themselves is often at the root of deficiencies in achieving effective methods of 
communication.  Furthermore, it has been proposed that organizational power resides primarily 
in organizational structures and that hierarchical structures remain central to the majority of 
contemporary organizations (Harley, 1999, p. 61).  Organizations where large scale hierarchical 
and bureaucratized structures are employed result in organic divisions and fragmentations that 
stifle communication (Morgan, 2006, p. 86).  The theory of bureaucracy, as defined by Max 
Weber (2005, orig. 1922), states that administrative rationality is achieved by dividing work into 
fixed official duties, having a hierarchy of authority, and developing systems of rules on how 
work is to be performed and decisions are to be made (pp. 73-74).  However, the increased 
rationality achieved from structuring an organization using the principles of bureaucracy can be 
paired with increasing compartmentalization within the organization that reduces the likelihood 
that critical information will flow freely.  For instance: 
 
Bureaucratization tends to create fragmented patterns of thought and action.  
Where hierarchical and horizontal divisions are particularly strong, information 
and knowledge rarely flow in a free manner.  Different sectors of the organization 
thus often operate on the basis of different pictures of the total situation, pursuing 
subunit goals almost as ends in themselves.  The existence of such divisions tends 
to emphasize the distinctions between different elements of the organization and 
fosters the development of political systems that place yet further barriers in the 
way of learning. (Morgan, 2006, p. 86) 
 
The presence of these divisions impedes the ability of members within the organization to 
transfer, share, and learn new information easily.  In addition, “investigations linking 
communication, information, and performance suggest that the ability to obtain information is 
directly related to individual and group performance” (Roberts & O’Reilly, 1979, p. 46).  In a 
bureaucracy, the result is often that those with the specific expertise and critical knowledge are at 
lower levels in the hierarchical structure with limited access to those in positions where decisions 
are made.  Consequently, decision makers often do not have access to essential information and 
organizational performance suffers. 
   Bureaucratic accountability and organizational structures that relate to rewarding and 
punishing employees also play a role in the effectiveness of communication during crises.  Peter 
Senge (2003) explains that when people feel threatened or vulnerable they often engage in 
defensive behaviors designed to protect themselves and their colleagues (p. 47).  Under 
situations of stress, employees will conceal or minimize issues or information that could or will 
reflect on them negatively.  Bureaucratic accountability also pushes administrators to find quick 
and easy answers, often with superficial information (Morgan, 2006, pp. 86-87). “In 
organizational contexts, formal structures, rules, job descriptions, and various conventions and 
beliefs offer themselves as convenient allies in the process of self-protection” (Morgan, 2006, p. 
87).  During a crisis, this type of behavior can be highly detrimental to the organization’s ability 
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to cope, share vital information, and develop sound decisions.  For these reasons, accountability 
structures, while serving a necessary role in the assessment of responsibility, can also serve as an 
impediment to necessary communication. 
   Furthermore, a review of the information processing literature reveals that hierarchies have a 
profound effect on the acquisition and dissemination of information in an organization.  Liberti 
and Mian (2009), in their work on the role of hierarchy in information collection and use, found 
that often in “large hierarchical systems…employees in charge of collecting information cannot 
act on it, and instead have to send information upwards for final decision” (p. 4062).  Moreover, 
they also explain that “while hierarchies provide advantages such as specialization and parallel 
processing, they also bring trade-offs in the form of costly communication across hierarchical 
levels” (Liberti and Main, 2009, p. 4062).  In addition, Hinds and Kiesler (1995), in their work 
on communicating across organizational boundaries, found that administrative work is most 
often associated with hierarchical communication.  They explain that: 
 
Authority offers an efficient alternative to direct communication under conditions 
of complexity and interdependence.  Rather than everybody repeatedly discussing 
what each person should do, management distributes and exercises control of 
work through layers of supervision, which in turn buffer managers from 
unnecessary communication… Strictly held, the division of labor into functionally 
specialized units and unity of command constrain communication linkages to 
specified verbal connections within the chain of command. (Hinds & Kiesler, 
1995, p. 375) 
    
Bureaucratic and hierarchical structures within organizations have a limiting role on the ability 
of employees to freely convey information to administrators outside their chain of command, and 
even at times to their own supervisors.  This negative aspect of the organizational structure is 
heightened during times of crisis, when critical information is often time-sensitive and when easy 
access to information is often essential.     
   In addition, examination of the crucial role organizational structures play in limiting 
information access during an organizational crisis also reveals a tie to bounded rationality.  The 
theory of bounded rationality, best described in the work of Herbert Simon, asserts that it is 
impossible for human beings to comprehend and analyze all of the potentially relevant 
information needed when making choices and as a result they “ ‘satisfice’ because they do not 
have the intellectual capacity to maximize” (as cited in Shafritz, Ott, & Jang, 2005, p. 90).  That 
is, they “settle for a ‘bounded rationality’ of ‘good enough’ decisions based on simple rules of 
thumb and limited search and information” (Morgan, 2006, p. 76).  Administrators are 
bombarded by information on a daily basis.  In times of crisis, the level of uncertainty combined 
with the overwhelming abundance of information, makes sifting though information in search of 
the correct solution a daunting task.  Uncertainty is always a factor in the earliest stages of a 
crisis.  As Ian Mitroff (2004) explains, in a crisis “there is tremendous technical and ethical 
uncertainty…regarding the proper assumptions that one has to make with regard to all the 
‘unknowns’.  Thus, the actions one should take are also highly uncertain” (p. 25).  In light of the 
high levels of uncertainty, administrators and staff members may fall back on their bureaucratic 
systems of rules and enact routine responses.  However, routine responses are predominately of 
little or no value in coping with crisis uncertainty (Seeger, Sellnow, & Ulmer, 2003, p. 71).   
   Likewise, in organizations that are highly compartmentalized the ability to have access to all 
the information needed to make the proper decision is often limited.  As Herbert Simon (1991) 
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states, “depending on its actual locus, knowledge may or may not be available at the decision 
points where it would be relevant” (p. 126).  This bounded rationality, inherent in the 
organizational design and structure of a bureaucracy, creates boundaries to information access.  
Employees, who are usually encouraged to occupy certain roles and take part in specified 
actions, are inhibited to openly share information without direct solicitation.  Administrators, 
faced with mounting uncertainty and demands for action, turn toward the information sources 
they are most familiar with and therefore, often miss opportunities to stretch outside their usual 
boundaries and acquire the information that would result in more effective decision making 
(Morgan, 2006, p. 86).   
   The literature also links the role organizational structures play in communication to 
disadvantageous decisions made by small insular groups, usually at the top of organizational 
hierarchies.  First among this body of work is the discussion of the behaviors known as 
groupthink.  Groupthink refers to “a mode of thinking that people engage in when they are 
deeply involved in a cohesive in-group, when the members’ striving for unanimity overrides 
their motivation to realistically appraise alternative courses of action” (Janis, 1982, p. 9).  In 
these situations, the decision making group isolates itself from other organization members, who 
often have direct knowledge of the crisis, and relies almost exclusively on group members for 
information and counsel. Other theorists have expanded upon these ideas by explaining that “by 
facilitating the development of shared illusions and related norms, these symptoms are used by 
groups to maintain an esprit de corps during difficult times (Whyte, 1989, p. 41).   
   Furthermore, Schafer and Crichlow (1996), in their work on uncovering the factors that most 
strongly contribute to the problematic group decision making inherent in groupthink, found that 
“the data suggest that the real problem lies in structural arrangements” (p. 427).  Specifically, 
they state that among the most problematic factors is the existence of traditional group 
procedures and that this factor is a strong predictor of information processing errors and 
unfavorable outcomes.  They conclude that policy makers should be aware of the role structure 
plays in a group’s ability to acquire and process information and for the development of 
procedures regarding information searches and evaluating the positive and negative aspects of a 
situation (Schafer & Crichlow, 1996, p. 429).  Moreover, researchers have found that the level of 
access to top-level decision makers can greatly affect communication during crises.  Specifically, 
in hierarchical organizations “access is tightly controlled by gatekeepers who determine what 
kinds of information will be presented.  If information is not available it cannot be taken into 
account” (Seeger, Sellnow, & Ulmer, 2003, p. 23).  Under these conditions, failures to allow for 
open exchanges of information during times of crisis will invariably result in inadequate 
organizational responses.   
          
Analysis of Organizational Structures and Crisis Communication 
   In relation to the MSU case study, the role bureaucratized and hierarchical structures played in 
the breakdown of effective communication during the crisis is clearly evident.  MSU is a large 
bureaucratic organization that employs approximately 11,320 faculty and staff.  These faculty 
and staff members are organized in a multitude of academic and administrative units, with varied 
systems of rules, and are lead by vice-presidents, deans, directors, and chairs.  The three top 
administrators, overseeing all university activities, are the President, the Provost, and the Vice 
President for Finance and Operations.  At the pinnacle of the hierarchy is the publicly elected 
Board of Trustees (“MSU Facts”, 2010).  The size of the University and its subsequent plethora 
of divisions result in organizational structures that foster insular operating practices and obstruct 
clear and consistent communication among units on campus.  In addition, because of the size of 
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the organization, top-level administrators are often removed from day-to-day operations and 
from the employees who have the most expertise and accurate hands-on information.  This was a 
contributing factor in the University Physician and Vice President for Finance and Operations’ 
decision to prematurely remove turkey from resident hall cafeterias.  MSU’s bureaucracy and 
hierarchy created fragmented structures that fostered the exclusion of the Food and Water 
Sanitarian and the food service managers from high-level discussions.  By initially excluding 
these staff members, administrators did not have access to critical information and expertise that 
would have resulted in more informed decision making.  Instead, administrators kept discussions 
and deliberations within their small in-group. Consequently, MSU’s top-level administrators, 
because of their removal from daily operations within the University and the insular nature of the 
institutionalized decision making norms in which they are a part, failed to recognize and seek out 
information that would have drastically altered their initial decisions.     
    
Lessons from Britain’s ‘Mad Cow’ Outbreak 
   Further insight into the factors that contributed to the communication breakdowns at MSU can 
be gained by examining other public health crises and their subsequent organizational responses.    
As discussed above, the fragmented structures embedded within the organizational design at 
MSU clearly contributed to the inability of key administrators to obtain, analyze, and utilize 
relevant information in their decision making during the E. coli crisis.  Another important 
example of organizational structures impeding communication and fostering groupthink can be 
observed in the case of the ‘Mad Cow’ outbreak in Great Britain.   
   Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE), often referred to as ‘Mad Cow’ disease, was first 
identified in November 1986 by the United Kingdom’s Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and 
Food. The disease, which affects the brain, has no effective treatment and no cure.  However, in 
spite of the seriousness of the disease, there was a delay of more than six months between its 
identification and the Minister of Agriculture being informed of the discovery.  In addition, not 
until a subsequent nine months had passed, was the Department of Health informed of the 
disease’s existence.  While the seriousness of the disease was widely recognized in terms of 
animal health, most experts maintained that the risk to humans was minimal (Maxwell, 1999, p. 
99).  British scientists were so convinced of this finding, that in 1990, Dr. David Tyrrell, the 
chairman of the Spongiform Encephalopathy Committee reported to the Chief Medical Officer, 
that “we believe that there is no scientific reason for not eating British beef and that it can be 
eaten by everyone” (Maxwell, 1999, p. 99).  In March of 1996, the British government was 
alerted about a study that had linked a new variant of Creutzfeldt-Jakob Disease (CJD), the main 
spongiform encephalopathy in humans, to BSE.  CJD, like BSE, has no effective treatment or 
cure and at that time had resulted in ten deaths in Britain.  As a result, the Secretary of State for 
Health announced that BSE might, after all, pose a threat to human health.  The announcement 
fueled growing public panic and anger at the government’s inability to discover the link between 
the two diseases earlier.  Beef sales plummeted and countries quickly banned the import of 
British cattle and beef.  In response to public demands, and faced with few other viable options, 
the government agreed to slaughter 4.7 million cattle (Maxwell, 1999, pp. 99-106). 
   The ‘Mad Cow’ outbreak is an informative case in terms of the effect organizational structure 
has on crisis communication.  First, the lag time between when BSE was initially discovered and 
when animal and human health officials were informed is reminiscent of the impediments to 
communication found in most bureaucracies.  It can often take considerable time for crucial 
information to flow from employees with specific expertise regarding a topic or situation, in this 
case BSE, and the top-level decision makers.  In addition, the literature revealed that 
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bureaucratic structural impediments to communication often contribute to groupthink among top-
level decision makers.  In the ‘Mad Cow’ case, the insular ‘in-group’ consisted of the veterinary 
and human medicine experts who deemed all British beef to be safe for consumption.  For nearly 
ten years, most experts thought the risk of BSE for humans was negligible and few medical 
experts, politicians, civil servants, or the public questioned these ascertains (Maxwell, 1999, p. 
106).  The specialization and differentiation of functions inherent in large scale bureaucracies 
foster areas where specialized knowledge is common among all of the unit’s members and is 
unlikely to be questioned by those inside or outside.  In the relation to the dangers of BSE, 
scientists failed to fully explain or acknowledge any uncertainties they may have had and were 
drawn into making statements that ultimately offered false reassurances.  In hindsight, it is easy 
to see that greater levels of dissent, voiced earlier within the medical community, and greater 
transparency regarding the scientific research being conducted on the diseases could have 
increased the likelihood of reducing the number of animal and human deaths.                   
 
Best Practices from Arkansas’s West Nile Outbreak 
   Although the MSU E. coli case and the British ‘Mad Cow’ crisis exemplify that breakdowns in 
crisis communication are not unique in large public organizations, there are also examples of 
similar organizations that have been able to overcome the constraints of bureaucratic and 
hierarchical structures.  Specifically, in direct contrast to the ‘Mad Cow’ outbreak and its ensuing 
communication related shortcomings, the Arkansas Department of Health’s response to the 
2002-2003 West Nile Virus (WNV) outbreak represents a best practices model in risk and crisis 
communication.   
   When Arkansas public health officials were first notified of potential infections of WNV, a 
mosquito-borne disease, being reported within the state, the Department of Health immediately 
assembled a team to monitor the cases.  The group consisted of a “wide-ranging group of 
individuals, including public health information communicators, the divisions of communicable 
disease and epidemiology, the state laboratory, the press office, the information technology 
office, the administration office, and a field assistance team from the United States Centers for 
Disease Control and Prevention” (Ulmer, Alvey, & Kordsmeier, 2008, p. 100).  The group went 
into action collecting information about WNV in Arkansas and communicating to the public 
about how the disease was spread and how to take precautions to avoid contracting the virus.  
After public health officials determined the cases of WNV were increasing in animals and 
humans, Arkansas’s Governor Mike Huckabee declared a statewide emergency and allocated $1 
million in state aid to assist counties in their efforts to stop the spread of the disease.  A large 
share of these monies went to the Arkansas Department of Health offices to assist in efforts to 
abate the state’s mosquito population.  Throughout the outbreak, the Arkansas Department of 
Health provided information to internal and external stakeholders and collaborated with other 
organizations to maximize their effectiveness.  Health officials were part of the National Public 
Health Information Coalition which allowed them to stay in touch with health officials in other 
states to share information about the virus.  They also coordinated with physicians across the 
state to keep a close watch on the number of cases.  In addition, their communications to the 
public were frequent, detailed and were presented truthfully and openly with an emphasis on 
education.  While five deaths resulted from the outbreak, its handling and containment were 
deemed by most stakeholders to be a success (Ulmer, Alvey, & Kordsmeier, 2008, pp. 100-106).   
   The WNV outbreak is informative in terms of the success that can be achieved in effective 
crisis communication when barriers imposed by organizational structures are overcome.  The 
Arkansas Department of Health avoided the slow flow of information regarding the crisis that 
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was a critical part of the ‘Mad Cow’ outbreak.  This was achieved by public health officials’ 
efforts to immediately organize the working group to gather information and communicate with 
stakeholders.  This step allowed public health officials and political leaders to have access to the 
most current information on the outbreak.  Prompt and accurate information supplied by 
scientists and health care professionals, inside and outside the state’s bureaucracy, allowed 
critical decisions to be made that lead to positive outcomes.  In addition, the variety of state 
offices and departments that were included in the emergency group shattered the 
compartmentalization that often accompanies large public sector bureaucracies.  Using each 
department’s specialized knowledge, instead of allowing that specialization to divide 
organization members, had clear positive results during the outbreak.  Furthermore, 
administrators were able to reduce the impediments to communication that result from 
hierarchical structures by seeking contributions from staff members at all levels within the 
organization.  The Arkansas Department of Health also succeeded in overcoming the barriers of 
its own structure by accepting stakeholders and organizations outside state government as 
legitimate partners.  “Organizations that involve other stakeholders in decision making about risk 
and preparation for crisis are likely to benefit from support of those groups during a 
crisis”(Ulmer, Alvey, & Kordsmeier, 2008, p.106).  Stepping outside their own organization to 
communicate and incorporate the viewpoints of others allowed the Arkansas Department of 
Health to avoid insular and disadvantageous decision making. 
 
STRATEGIES FOR IMPROVEMENT: STRUCTURAL EMPOWERMENT, LATERAL 
RELATIONSHIPS & ORGANIZATIONAL LEARNING 
 
   In light of the review and analysis of the relevant literature, as well as the case studies 
discussed above, the following question must be answered: Are there techniques/strategies 
available that can be utilized to improve organizational design and function in order to enhance 
communication in general, and also during crises?  Given the exposed deficiencies of 
bureaucratic and hierarchical structures in fostering effective communication during a crisis, 
determining how an organization can overcome these factors is challenging.  While its negatives 
have been discussed at length, bureaucracy also offers an organization an efficient way to 
maintain control and fulfill its mission.  For this reason, bureaucracies and organizational 
hierarchies remain popular and abolishing them entirely as a method of organizational design is 
not realistic.  However, researchers have found that “under conditions of uncertainty and 
information asymmetry…contingencies will arise that cannot be fully anticipated and effectively 
controlled by traditional methods of hierarchical supervision and surveillance” (Mills & Ungson, 
2003, p. 143). As a result, practices promoting greater decentralized structures, efficient 
information processing, and organizational learning can be used to improve an organization’s 
ability to facilitate effective methods of communication overall and during times of crisis. 
 
 
 
 
Structural Empowerment 
   One such strategy involves concepts incorporated in the theories of empowerment.  The term 
empowerment has a variety of meanings throughout the organizational theory literature.  
However, the definition most commonly associated with structural empowerment offers the 
greatest potential as a method for improving communication within organizations.  Specifically, 
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structural empowerment advocates for a decentralized organizational structure that allows for the 
“delegation of decision making prerogatives to employees, along with the discretion to act on 
one’s own.  In the process, opportunities for employee responsibility and initiatives are created” 
(Mills & Ungson, 2003, p. 144).  The idea of structural empowerment is closely related to the 
principles of human resources theory.  Broadly, human resources theory calls for establishing 
supportive workplace relationships, allowing workers to be self-directing, and providing 
opportunities for them to fully develop and utilize their own skills.  The theory maintains that 
increased employee involvement and autonomy enhances organizational performance 
(Tompkins, 2005, p. 271). 
   Granting employees greater levels of responsibility creates an environment where their skills 
and expertise can be optimally utilized.  Where bureaucratic structures stifle the exchange of 
information, an empowered, more decentralized structure would allow organization members to 
exchange information in ways that will help ensure the accomplishment of the organization’s 
goals and the development of more informed decisions during a crisis. Structural empowerment 
encourages employees to utilize their expertise and creativity and to exchange their ideas with 
their co-workers.  Organization members that continuously interact and share information will 
likely build better, more trusting relationships.  As a result, “structural empowerment is the 
enabling condition under which stable and continuous exchanges of information and resources 
among organizational participants is facilitated and sustained” (Mills & Ungson, 2003, p. 144).  
Admittedly, there is a level of control lost by administrators within an organization that embraces 
structural empowerment and implementation of these changes may need to be incremental in 
order to ensure organizational objectives remain central and unified.  However, the benefits that 
could be achieved by freeing the innovative, creative, and critical thinking skills of the 
organization’s members are significant and worthwhile.       
 
Lateral Relationships 
   The information processing literature also provides design strategies for increasing the 
effectiveness of crisis communication within organizations.  For instance, Jay R. Galbraith 
(1974) explains how deficiencies in information processing relate to organizational design.  
Specifically, Galbraith highlights the link between increasing uncertainty and the resultant 
breakdowns in effective information processing within hierarchical structures.  As he explains: 
 
As the organization faces greater uncertainties its participants face situations for 
which they have no rules.  At this point the hierarchy is employed on an exception 
basis.  The recurring job situations are programmed with rules while infrequent 
situations are referred to that level in the hierarchy where a global perspective 
exists for all affected subunits.  However, the hierarchy also has a limited range.  
As uncertainty increases the number of exceptions increases until the hierarchy 
becomes overloaded. (Galbraith, 1974, p. 29) 
 
Therefore, for Galbraith (1974), “the critical limiting factor” of an organizational structure must 
be seen as its ability to handle non-routine, highly uncertain events (p. 30).  An organizational 
design that is overly dependent on crisis decision making and information processing by 
members at the top of its hierarchical structure is doomed to experience incomplete information 
transfers resulting in greater instances of erroneous decision making.   
   As a result, Galbraith proposes a concept of organizational design that responds to uncertainty 
by increasing interactions between varying levels of an organization.  This organizational design 
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focuses on what Galbraith (1974) terms “lateral relationships” (p. 32).  As he explains, this 
strategy “employ[s] selectively joint decision processes which cut across lines of 
authority…[and] moves the level of decision making down in the organization to where the 
information exists…” (Galbraith, 1974, p. 32).  Creating lateral relationships can take a variety 
of forms but focuses on designing organizations that can more quickly adapt to uncertainty by 
fostering effective and frequent communication between critical actors with varied functions and 
positions within the organization’s structure.  For instance, Galbraith highlights the effective role 
of taskforces in bringing various departments together to work collaboratively on a specific issue 
or crisis.  He also identifies the utilization of specialized roles, such as “liaison roles” and 
“integrating roles”, to bridge gaps between interdependent departments, as well as between 
administrators and those employees lower in the hierarchy who are often closest to critical 
information (Galbraith, 1974, p. 33).  For example, liaison roles are developed when it is 
recognized that two departments have a need to share a large volume of information.  
Specifically, liaisons “are typical examples of specialized roles designed to facilitate 
communication between two interdependent departments and to bypass the long lines of 
communication involved in upward referral” (Galbraith, 1974, p. 33).   
   In addition, integrating roles are created to help facilitate group decision processes for issues 
that are viewed as more permanent than those that can be handled by a temporary taskforce.   
Persons in integrating roles “are selected so as to be unbiased with respect to the groups they 
integrate and to have  technical competence…They collect information and equalize power 
differences due to preferential access to knowledge and information” (Galbraith, 1974, p. 34).  
As a result, creating lateral relationships within an organization allows for more efficient and 
effective information processing than can be achieved through traditional hierarchical structures 
alone.  Similar to the ideas encompassed in structural empowerment, lateral relationships seek to 
design organizations that recognize information processing and decision making must take into 
account the plethora of expert knowledge available in all of the organization’s departments and 
at all levels within the organizational structure. 
 
Organizational Learning 
   Another technique that could be employed in organizations in order to reduce the negative 
effects of bureaucratic and hierarchical structures is organizational learning.  The theories of 
organizational learning are largely based on the ideas of cybernetics.  Cybernetics suggests that 
in order for organizations to learn they must be able to: 
• Scan and anticipate change in the wider environment to detect significant variations.   
• Develop an ability to question, challenge, and change operating norms and assumptions.    
• Allow an appropriate direction and pattern of organization to emerge. (Morgan, 2006, p. 
87)  
  
This process also involves avoiding traditional management control systems and the defensive 
behaviors of organizational members (Morgan, 2006, p. 87).  In addition, cybernetics emphasizes 
that feedback from the external and internal organizational environments plays a critical role in 
changing the structure of the organization (Buckley, 1967, p. 56).   
   Organizational learning offers organizations a method to overcome the obstacles of 
bureaucratic management through skills and practices that allow organization members the 
ability to extend beyond traditional methods of acquiring information and take part in actions 
that question whether operating norms are appropriate.  Chris Argyris (1983) proposes one 
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method of achieving this objective through the dichotomy of single-loop and double-loop 
learning.  Single-loop and double-loop learning are defined as: 
 
One type (of organizational learning) involves the production of matches, or the 
detection and correction of mismatches, without change to the underlying 
governing policies or values.  This is called single-loop learning.  A second type, 
double-loop learning, does require re-examination and change of the governing 
values.  Single-loop learning is usually related to the routine, immediate task.  
Double-loop learning is related to the non-routine, the long range outcome [italics 
in original]. (Argyris, 1983, p. 116) 
 
Single-loop learning involves an organization scanning and monitoring its environment, 
comparing the information that is gathered against its operating norms, and selecting the 
appropriate response from those norms.  Single-loop learning practices have been mastered by 
most organizations and they serve the purpose of keeping the organization in line with traditional 
operating norms (Morgan, 2006, p. 85).  Stated another way, these practices contribute to an 
organization maintaining its organizational structuring.  While this type of organizational 
learning can have a stabilizing effect, it can also produce negative outcomes when faced with the 
uncertainties that often accompany crises.   
   In comparison, double-loop learning promotes organizational behaviors that review and 
challenge operating norms (Argyris, 1983, p. 116).  Double-loop learning requires an 
organization’s members, and often key decision makers, to question the relevance of operating 
norms.  In many cases this involves the ability to step outside the standard operating procedures 
instituted by bureaucracy and seek new information that is critical in times of crisis.  As has been 
previously discussed, “a top-down approach to management, especially one focusing on 
control…encourages single-loop learning but discourages the double-loop thinking that is so 
important for an organization to evolve” (Morgan, 2006, p. 92).  If an organization embraces a 
double-loop style of learning, administrators will have greater ability to question the relevance of 
operating norms.  As is in the case of structural empowerment, the implementation of 
organizational learning will take a dedicated effort from upper-level administrators to foster an 
organizational culture that embraces its principles, along with mechanisms by which staff 
members can utilize double-loop learning techniques.  If implemented correctly, this practice 
could result in the correction of errors, in the short-term, such as during a crisis, and in the long-
term improve the standards that guide the organization. 
 
Strategies Applied: Reexamining the Case Studies  
   The benefits of structural empowerment, lateral relationships, and organizational learning are 
clearly evident when applied to the case studies previously described.  In relation to the ‘Mad 
Cow’ outbreak, health officials were constrained by structures within their organization that kept 
them on the path of predetermined norms.  The crisis escalated because critical information was 
delayed and nothing in the organization’s structure pushed officials to question the results 
previously reported or allowed for the free exchange of information.  If the Ministry of Health 
officials and policy makers would have had a more double-loop learning orientation they would 
have likely been more skeptical of the ability of standard practices to handle the non-standard 
situation.  This questioning would have in turn initiated greater communication and information 
sharing among key stakeholders.  In addition, if the Ministry of Health had utilized greater 
structural empowerment and lateral relationship practices, information could have been 
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disseminated more quickly because it would have bypassed bureaucratic and hierarchical 
reporting lines.   
   Similarly, the MSU E. coli outbreak’s communication mishaps were the result of an adherence 
to organizational structures that fostered behavior among top-level administrators to primarily 
seek information and counsel from other members of the University’s upper administration.  
Lower-level employees, who possessed the knowledge that would have lead to more sound 
decisions, were not empowered by the organization’s structure to share their knowledge and 
were not included in discussions in which initial key decisions were made.  It was not until 
previous decisions were questioned and more lower-level staff members were included in 
discussions, that a more complete picture of the situation was determined.  Following the 
operating norms imposed by an organization’s structure can be highly detrimental to efficient 
and effective crisis communication and can cause missteps that could have been avoided if a 
more open perspective had been employed.     
   In comparison, the Arkansas Department of Health was able to reduce the negative effects of 
structure by being innovative and fostering the unrestricted flow of information.   Although it is 
not fully apparent whether or not they knowingly utilized the tools of structural empowerment, 
lateral relationships, or organizational learning, there are clearly some connections that can be 
made between their actions and the theories.  First, the Arkansas Department of Health avoided 
the slow flow of information regarding the crisis, which was a crucial part of the ‘Mad Cow’ 
outbreak, by immediately organizing a working group to gather information and communicate 
with stakeholders.  The group consisted of staff members from a variety of state offices and 
departments.  The Arkansas Department of Health in effect decentralized its organizational 
structure within this group.  Like the ideas presented in structural empowerment and lateral 
relationships, the de-fragmentation of the state’s bureaucracy within this group eliminated 
barriers and allowed staff members to communicate and utilize their expertise.   The Arkansas 
Department of Health also succeeded in overcoming the barriers of its own structure by 
accepting stakeholders and organizations outside state government as legitimate partners.   
   In addition, double-loop learning also appears to have had a place in the Arkansas public health 
officials’ actions.  Instead of merely relying on operating norms, officials relied on prompt and 
accurate information supplied by scientists and health care professionals, inside and outside the 
state’s bureaucracy, to make critical decisions regarding the outbreak.  Health officials assessed 
their environment and realized the spread of the West Nile Virus called for non-routine action by 
the organization and its members.  Recognizing the unique nature of the outbreak and taking 
immediate steps to foster communication and gather information allowed the organization to 
learn.  These actions ultimately lead to positive outcomes.  While not offering a way to 
completely negate the effects of bureaucracy and hierarchy on the flow of information during a 
crisis, the strategies related to structural empowerment, lateral relationships, and organizational 
learning have the ability to promote an organizational structure that empowers employees to 
utilize their own skills, improve access to critical information, and question procedural norms, 
which can in turn foster more productive communication.       
 
 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
   Effective crisis management and effective crisis communication are inherently connected.  An 
examination of recent public health crises, specifically the MSU E. coli, British ‘Mad Cow’ 
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virus, and Arkansas West Nile virus outbreaks, reveals that crisis communication plays a vital 
role in the realization of positive or negative outcomes.  Therefore, in reference to the key 
questions that have focused this analysis, one must ask what has been learned about the 
organizational factors that contribute to effective and ineffective crisis communication.  A 
review and analysis of the literature, as well as the related case studies, has provided some clear 
answers to those questions.  Specifically, this analysis reveals that impediments to effective crisis 
communication in organizations are directly related to organizational structure and that the 
situation presented in the MSU case study is not unique.  Organizations where large scale 
bureaucratic and hierarchical structures are employed result in organic divisions and 
fragmentations that stifle communication. While bureaucracy offers an efficient way to maintain 
control in a large complex organization it is often paired with increasing compartmentalization 
that reduces the likelihood that critical information will flow freely. Bureaucratic accountability 
and organizational structures that relate to rewarding and punishing employees also play a role in 
the effectiveness of communication during crises by increasing the likelihood of information 
suppression.  In addition, researchers have found connections between organizational structures 
and bounded rationality and the occurrence of groupthink.  Furthermore, while it is understood 
that crises do heighten uncertainty, an analysis of the case studies has shown a crisis does not 
automatically correlate to large scale breakdowns in communication.  Overall, whether in the 
literature or in the real-life examples discussed, the conclusion that bureaucratic and hierarchical 
structures impede communication and information gathering is clearly evident. 
   However, having the knowledge that organizational structures affect crisis communication is 
not enough in light of the dire consequences of negative outcomes in crisis situations.  
Maintaining effective communication during a crisis, and for that matter during normal 
operations, is essential in order for an organization to successfully fulfill its mission.  Therefore, 
in organizations that are highly bureaucratic and hierarchical some reforms are necessary.  
Although by no means exhaustive, the concepts related to structural empowerment, lateral 
relationships, and organizational learning offer methods by which organizations can attempt to 
overcome the negative aspects of their structures. In efforts to better handle these situations, 
structural empowerment advocates for an organizational structure that allows for the delegation 
of greater levels of decision making to employees along with granting them some level of 
discretion to act on their own.  During this process, opportunities for employees to take on 
responsibility and be innovative are created.  Granting employees greater levels of responsibility 
creates an environment where their skills and expertise can be optimally utilized.  Where 
bureaucratic structures often stifle the exchange of information, an empowered, more 
decentralized structure allows organization members to exchange information in ways that will 
better ensure the development of more informed decisions during a crisis.   
   In addition, the information processing literature provides strategies related to organizational 
design that increase the interaction between various levels of an organization.  For instance, by 
developing an organization that encompasses lateral relationships, the negative aspects of 
organizational structures related to bureaucracy and hierarchy can be weakened by creating 
functions and roles that facilitate effective information processing.  Specifically, by creating the 
ability for varied departments to interact on specific problems through taskforces, or for more 
permanent issues, through specialized actors in liaison and integrating roles, organizations can 
achieve more effective and efficient communication within all parts of the organization.  Similar 
to the ideas of structural empowerment, the creation of lateral relationships highlights the fact 
that critical information is often found at lower levels within the organization.  As a result, 
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organizations must be designed in such a way as to facilitate the efficient transfer of this 
information or to allow for more decision making authority at lower levels within the hierarchy.   
   Furthermore, organizational learning offers tools to overcome the obstacles of bureaucratic 
structures through skills and practices that allow organization members the ability to extend 
beyond traditional methods of acquiring information by taking part in actions that question 
whether operating norms are appropriate. Specifically, the concept described as double-loop 
learning promotes organizational behaviors that review and challenge standard operating 
procedures.  Double-loop learning requires organization members, and often key decision 
makers, to question the relevance of operating norms to adequately respond to situations 
confronting the organization.  In many cases this involves the ability to step outside the standard 
operating procedures instituted by bureaucracy and seek new information that is critical in times 
of crisis.  While these theories are far from a panacea for the negative effects organizational 
structures can have on crisis communication, they do offer ways in which organizations can 
identify and reform the structures that are most problematic.  
 
Suggestions for Further Research 
   Although a great deal of insight has been gained into the factors that contribute to breakdowns 
in crisis communication, there is more that could and should be known in order to improve the 
effectiveness of public organizations.  To expand on these concepts, further research should be 
conducted that focuses on public organizations during and after a crisis.  Through staff member 
interviews and a review of communication methods during a crisis, researchers could attempt to 
gauge the level of access to information key decision makers had and sought during the crisis.  It 
would be of specific interest to analyze if and how information was exchanged between staff 
members at different levels within the organizational hierarchy, specifically to determine if 
communication and information was distributed along pre-defined organizational structures or by 
alternative methods.  In addition, evaluating the utilization of double-loop style learning during a 
crisis would expand on the current body of work to assess its validity during crises.   Another 
potential approach for further research would involve analysis to determine if evaluating an 
organization’s structure following a crisis changes that structure.  In particular, studying whether 
or not post-crisis structures and selected adaptations seek to reinforce, diminish, or maintain 
bureaucracy and hierarchy would be highly informative.  Furthermore, research focused on 
public organizations that have instituted strategies related to structural empowerment, lateral 
relationships, or organizational learning would be beneficial to assess if these strategies provide 
real long-term benefits.  Moving forward, whether in research or in practice, crisis managers and 
public administrators must recognize that effective communication is vital for all organizations, 
especially in times of crisis.  Continuing to examine, create, and reform organizational structures 
and information processing techniques to better facilitate communication is a valuable and 
necessary endeavor.  
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